Every prominent member of the Labour Party in Wales has offered their two pence worth as to what they think the reason for the defeat in May was. I believe enough time has passed for me, as a not-so-prominent member, to offer mine.
I joined the party at 16 in May 2020. We weren’t exactly on a high then – at least, in Westminster terms. In Wales, Labour has enjoyed a century of dominance in parliamentary elections, and has formed every government since the advent of devolution in 1999. It has been said to constitute ‘the most successful democratic party in the world,’ and it was truly hard to imagine the concept of a defeat in Wales until now, let alone the scale of it. I have some views on the party’s apparent drift away from its previous stance of being distinct from the UK government, since the 2024 General Election.
I campaigned in 2021, 2024 and 2026. Already by 2024, I felt a difference in how we were being perceived. In 2021, we had Mark Drakeford as party leader and First Minister. I heard on the doorsteps praise for the different approach we had taken to the UK Government on COVID-19, and for the forward-thinking and progressive politics Welsh Labour had put forward in the 21 years up to that point. By 2024, we were suffering with the fall-out from the enacting of the default 20mph speed limit on restricted roads, an unpopular First Minister in Vaughan Gething, and dissatisfaction with the position of the Labour Party on Gaza.
Welsh Labour’s period of dominance in the early years of devolution rested on more than electoral habit; it relied on a clear sense that devolved government in Cardiff was doing something recognisably different from Westminster. That contrast gave Labour a form of political legitimacy in Wales that was tied to the idea that devolution was meaningful in practice, not just constitutional theory.
Since the leadership changes that followed Drakeford’s departure, that sense of differentiation has become harder to perceive. Whether through tighter alignment with UK Labour messaging or a reduced capacity to articulate a separate Welsh political narrative, the gap between Cardiff Bay and Westminster had narrowed in public perception. As that gap closed, Labour’s identity as the clear political expression of contemporary Welsh governance has weakened. Voters – and indeed some members – have found themselves less able to distinguish what, if anything, is uniquely “Welsh” about Welsh Labour, instead seeing a blurred extension of Westminster politics filtered through devolved administration.
A further change has been the party’s apparent retreat from the softer civic-national framing that previously underpinned its devolved identity. Under Drakeford in particular, Welsh Labour was comfortable presenting Wales as a distinct political community within the Union, with its own priorities, tone, and policy emphasis. This was not nationalism in a constitutional sense, but a form of civic self-definition that gave devolution emotional as well as administrative weight.
More recently, however, there has been a discernible shift away from that posture. In attempting to avoid any perception of nationalism, however soft, the party risks stripping itself of the very language that previously made its governance feel anchored in Wales rather than merely applied to it.
The attempt under Eluned Morgan to articulate a “Red Welsh Way” can be read as an effort to re-establish the kind of distinct Welsh identity previously associated with the “Clear Red Water” era. By the time the “Red Welsh Way” was advanced, however, that foundation had already weakened. Voters already saw the ‘Partnership in Power’ and – rightly or wrongly – felt that it simply was not delivering for them. Add in the opposite end of the coin of a perceived threat of an alien, English form of right-wing politics espoused by Reform, and progressives fled too, for the best-placed alternative.
Plaid Cymru’s gains suggest that a significant strand of discontent is still being channelled through questions of Welsh political identity and governance, rather than simply rejecting the system altogether. At the same time, support for Reform indicates a separate but equally important form of volatility, rooted more in dissatisfaction with mainstream politics, and indeed the Senedd as an institution.
These shifts point not to a single unified “rebellion”, but to a fragmentation of Labour’s coalition from different directions at once — with different voters leaving for different reasons, and no single narrative fully capturing the loss.
Eluned Morgan did not take a healthy Welsh Labour and make it sick. I do not think she is personally responsible for this outcome, any more than any single politician can be held accountable for shifts of this scale. Nor do I think the explanation can be reduced to one factor or one moment.
Whether Welsh Labour’s position can be recovered will depend not on branding or leadership alone, but on whether the party can once again articulate a sense of political purpose that is clearly Welsh in substance, not just geography.
