The central question one must keep coming back to throughout this article is whether we are adapting the vision of NATO’s founders or forgetting it. Of course, as we will see, they left a framework that was meant to be adapted according to the times but is there a difference between that and forgetting NATO’s purpose?
It was March 1947 – two years after the Second World War and France had signed a mutual defence agreement with the United Kingdom in a pact known as the Treaty of Dunkirk. The idea was to guard the nations against any potential resurgence in German power. Whether this was a likely scenario or not, in an era where the Cold War had just begun, the former superpowers couldn’t be too cautious when it came to growing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.
A year later, in March 1948, a new Treaty of Brussels expanded the principles of Dunkirk to include Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Though institutions including some variations of “Union” were either in early stages or nonexistent at the time, the Treaty of Brussels formed the first piece of tangible evidence of a Western Union. Rather, a union of liberal democracies pushing the alliance beyond simply military goals.
These two treaties can be interpreted as the primary frameworks that brought the concept of collective security to life; a concept that, before WW2, was alien. Secret security talks, meanwhile, were beginning to develop in Washington between the US, UK and Canada as their representatives began to explore what a North Atlantic security system could look like. Following the collapse of the London Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in late ‘47, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin approached US Secretary of State George Marshall about this idea. This led to Marshall going straight to President Truman to brief him on the situation in Europe and its evolution into a Cold War battleground. These meetings resulted in Marshall being granted permission to engage in exploratory contacts.
Thus began the Pentagon Talks which operated in extreme secrecy due to prevailing isolationist sentiment in America at the time. State Department experts Jack Hickerson and Ted Achilles orchestrated these talks held between March 22nd and April 1st 1948 between British, American and Canadian officials.
For the record, it’s up for debate whether the USA emerged from its reluctance for permanent alliances out of moral goodwill or self interest in the face of the Soviets. One wouldn’t be wrong to think of it as a combination of both. In exchange, Europe could have its security guaranteed by a global superpower rather than killing their own limited budgets for sophisticated defence of its own. As such, both sides could get what they want and project an image of political solidarity along the way. At least, that’s my interpretation of it.
The founders could put it better.
Harry Truman was born in Missouri to a modest, rural midwestern family. As the last US President who didn’t get a college degree, Truman worked as a bank clerk and ran his family’s farm; his clothing business failed during the 1921 downturn. The work ethic, sense of accountability and plain style of communication acquired during these years would become a cornerstone of how NATO would be conceived. Truman served in France during WW1 and was in the Senate during WW2 – also responsible for the atomic decision. A New Deal Democrat, Truman advocated for expansion of civil rights, formulated the containment Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan. He was close with Acheson and defended him against the Red Scare; Truman also backed the idea of European integration which was being worked on by Spaak and Schuman.
What was NATO according to President Truman? A bulwark against the Soviets in Europe. Key to his doctrine. An alliance of like-minded countries.
Truman’s Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, was the Atlanticist who would provide the diplomacy for NATO. Born in Connecticut to a wealthy family, Acheson got a law degree at Yale, subsequently serving as a law clerk to a Supreme Court justice. He joined the State Department in 1941, managing crucial economic policy during WW2 such as Lend-Lease; he also played a significant role in the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, which established the post-war economic order. The next question was about establishing the post-war security order. Acheson was a pragmatic realist who aided Truman in containment, and though he was an internationalist who believed in American power, he was blamed for the loss of China to communism. By working closely with Bevin on NATO and Schuman on European reconciliation, Acheson saw NATO in the same way Truman did.
The Europeans were working on two projects at once: NATO and European integration. Robert Schuman was born in Luxembourg, growing up with both French and German, later going on to obtain a law degree in Germany. His commitment to reconciliation and peace can be rooted in his beliefs as a Roman Catholic, later advocating for Christian Democracy. It was these beliefs which he held onto when he was arrested by the Gestapo in 1940, imprisoned and later when he escaped in 1942. In European history, he is best known for the Schuman Declaration and tying Franco-German coal resources together to make war materially impossible. This was the project that he worked on closely with Spaak, but he would come to see early signs of British reluctance towards European integration from Bevin. For Schuman, Bevin and Spaak, NATO was the umbrella that could counter the Soviets and complemented the early construction of the EEC.
Ernest Bevin was born in Somerset into deep poverty. As a self-educated pragmatist, Bevin rose through the ranks to found and lead the Transport and General Workers Union in 1922, which would become the largest in the world. Though deeply loyal to the Labour movement, he was appointed by Churchill during the wartime coalition years to lead the Ministry of Labour and organise the home front; the coalition bridging the gap between Conservatives and Labour. Bevin was an anti-communist Labour figure who sought to stop communists from infiltrating the movement; he believed that a strong domestic state and an assertive foreign policy were the key to protecting Britain and was a supporter of decolonisation. Therefore, NATO was the shield behind which Europe could recover and protect their freedoms.
Born into a distinguished political and literary family in Belgium, Paul-Henri Spaak’s uncle was Prime Minister. Spaak studied law to become a lawyer and later joined the Belgian Socialist Party, spending two years as a POW in WW1. It was in 1938 where he served as Foreign Minister and the youngest PM. A pragmatic socialist, Spaak was nicknamed “Mr Europe” due to his role in the Treaty of Rome negotiations. In his view, small European nations needed collective security to survive, serving as the 2nd Secretary General to strengthen the alliance.
It’s so important to not overlook the role of Canada in the formation of NATO because, if it weren’t for figures such as Lester B Pearson, core articles to the Treaty wouldn’t have come into fruition. Pearson was born in Toronto to deeply religious parents, excelling as an athlete during his time at the University of Toronto, later attending Oxford. During WW1, he served in the medical corps but was sent back to Canada after getting hit by a bus and surviving an aeroplane crash. After joining the Department of External Affairs in 1927, he later became a senior diplomat in London during the Blitz and later served as Ambassador to the US. As a liberal interventionist, he believed in Canada making the most of multilateral institutions. He later went on to win the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize and founded Medicare during his time as PM. Pearson was also the primary drafter of the Treaty, constructing Article 2 (which became known as the “Canadian Article”) to ensure that NATO was more than just a military alliance, something that was permanent.
When one looks at the differing backgrounds and beliefs of the key founders of NATO, it can be argued that the challenge was not the idea itself, but putting the idea into practice. It was all good and well having grand political visions, but making NATO work was a separate task altogether. For all their differences, the one thing tying these individuals together was their desire to never see war again.
As such, the North Atlantic Council was founded in April 1949 under Article 9 of the Treaty as NATO’s core decision-making body. Though a non-permanent component during 1949-52, it became permanent after an organisational overhaul. Permanent Representatives to the Council being appointed meant that convening was swifter and easier.
Moreover, SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) created the unified command structure.
During this era, there are two individuals worth mentioning as they made NATO work. Dwight Eisenhower was Supreme Allied Commander Europe during the Korean War. By establishing the “New Look Policy” to shift toward air power and tactical nuclear weapons, Eisenhower modernised the alliance, also playing a key role in the integration of West Germany into the alliance. He hoped that Europe would develop its own strategic defence in the future.
General Hastings Ismay was NATO’s first Secretary General between 1952-57 and was a British General and diplomat. Here is how he described the purpose of NATO:
“Keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”
One can argue that the founders understood something that we can’t. Perhaps through their times in the war, they were able to harness their personal experiences – not for ego or self-centred sympathy – but for the construction of something that could last for generations. But if I had one criticism of them, it would be this: they greatly underestimated how future generations could take their structures for granted. As wartime memory dies away, so too does our capacity to appreciate these questions – why is peace so fragile, and what is stopping the Third World War?
The 1956 Three Wise Men report was authored by Pearson of Canada, Martino of Italy and Lange of Norway – all Foreign Ministers at the time. The project began after the Suez Crisis, which exposed how internal divisions among member states could weaken the wider alliance. This resulted in four main conclusions being drawn:
- Greater political consultation was needed to discuss foreign policy issues before unilateral action was taken.
- NATO was going to be more than a military alliance. It would be a political one too.
- Member states should settle their disputes internally before going public.
- Science programs and other cultural exchanges could foster greater unity among nations.
US Secretary of State Dulles saw that the Soviets were moving away from military intimidation and thus was keen for NATO to expand into non-military spheres, hence the particular emphasis on Point 4. Moreover, smaller European nations needed their voices to be heard when among bigger powers, and the Anglo-French disaster in the Suez (of which the US had no warning) meant that there was greater demand for adequate communication among member states.
Of course, NATO’s true foundation was rooted in democracy, freedom and human welfare. Even when the Cold War came to an end, the founders wanted NATO to endure as the tie that brings the West together. Their argument rested on the idea that national security depended on civic stability, economic progress and diplomacy. It was intentional to leave behind a flexible Treaty and infrastructure because, whilst terms like “hybrid warfare” were futuristic, the alliance had to be ready to face new challenges and remain relevant as time went on.
NATO outlasted the Soviet Union and survived the Cold War. Through the vision of the founders, this was a moment of profound vindication. Has NATO fulfilled its purpose? Should it now be disbanded? NATO was an alliance of democracies as well as a military alliance, so expanding eastwards seemed the only logical conclusion to address the long-term goal of a peaceful European continent – bound by shared values rather than a shared enemy.
They celebrated the alliance’s 50th anniversary in April 1999 at the Washington Summit. It was the event that bridged the end of the Cold War, the peak of the Kosovo campaign and the alliance looking towards the 21st century. The alliance was formally signified as a political as well as a military community, as the Three Wise Men report envisioned.
At the Washington Summit, a new Strategic Concept was adopted as the world got ready for the new century. Building on the principles of Article 2, they elevated non-Article 5 crisis response operations and partnership initiatives. The Summit was also during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo which was seen as the application of the alliance’s political values and to stop ethnic cleansing on Europe’s doorstep. Its significance lay in the fact that it was NATO’s first major offensive military action and its first intervention outside the traditional treaty boundaries. True security, the leadership at the time argued, can’t be separated from human rights. Instability in the Balkans, they added, directly threatens European stability. Preserving peace, therefore, means addressing humanitarian crises before they destabilise the international community.
By additionally marking the entry of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into the alliance, NATO became an open organisation of sorts as opposed to a bloc opposing another.
This was the legacy of the Third Way generation in NATO. Largely referring to leaders such as Clinton, Blair, Schröder and others, their foreign policy ideology was pragmatic. To them, security meant balancing free trade, democracy and humanitarian goals. Blair’s 1999 Doctrine of the International Community speech advocated for an ethical foreign policy. In turn, this would expand the democratic zone of peace.
They were also beginning to realise that threats were not coming from individual states, but were instead becoming decentralised.
The 9/11 attacks proved this. The scale of the tragedy prompted Article 5 to be triggered for the first and only time: an attack on one, according to the Article, is an attack on all. If anything, many during the Cold War era believed that if this Article were to be triggered, it would be for Europe, not the US. The subsequent deployment to Afghanistan demonstrated that NATO simply has to get used to the new world of warfare and adapt accordingly.
I have written about the War on Terror before, and its impact on the countries attacked as well as the West, so I won’t deliberate on this era for too long. But it must also be said that subsequent disasters in Iraq and later Libya showed what the consequences of a divided alliance look like. Of course, these interventions were not by NATO, but by ad hoc coalitions between member states. Moreover, the financial crash of 2008 and the domestic political instability it sparked demonstrate that NATO is not immune to the internal conflicts of member states. One of NATO’s key strengths – its political layers – quickly became its greatest weakness during this era as it grew into a punching bag for populists and as defence spending in Europe steadily declined.
If the alliance is weaker today, it is because of a lack of unity, a lack of funds, a lack of communication and a lack of remembrance of why the original Treaty was written in the first place.
As the generations go on and we become further removed from the war and the founders, modern NATO is now occupied by people who don’t quite know how to use the alliance to their advantage. Modern-day NATO also never quite knew how to deal with Russia.
Take the 2008 Bucharest Summit for instance. It was here that sharp divisions over whether Ukraine and Georgia should be granted MAPs to pave the way for them to join NATO. The US enthusiastically backed this status, whereas France and Germany opposed it, unwilling to take the risk of provoking Russia. These divisions were unresolved and led to the following declaration being made:
Ukraine and Georgia will become members, but at the moment, there is no official path that will be undertaken to ensure this is granted.
Bucharest gave Ukraine and Georgia the worst of both worlds. Where the founders advocated for clarity, NATO in 2008 created a window of vulnerability.
Any progress made in Western-Russian relations reverted back to business as usual after the 2008 invasion of Georgia. Furthermore, the 2014 annexation of Crimea resulted in yet another split in the West – some advocating for harsh sanctions and others wanting to continue economic cooperation out of reliance on Russian gas.
The founders often warned that the West has no hope against aggression if member states were each doing their own thing. Indeed, the lack of unity and a long-term strategy allowed for a later exploitation of weaknesses.
Today’s generation, thus far, is failing and failing badly. It is no coincidence that it is under them that the invasion of Ukraine happened, which is not merely a failure of planning, but a failure of the West and the order they advocated for since the end of WW2.
The founders wanted to prevent war on the European continent. I have looked at many shifted goals and strategies in this article, but above all, this was their core aim. In a world now where one can’t turn back time and where durable peace is no longer guaranteed, today’s foreign policy establishment would do well to remember the history behind the institutions they represent – and how best to use them to address the crises of today.
“Will the treaty accomplish its purpose? No one can say with certainty. We can only act on our convictions… The purpose of our strength is not aggression; it is the exact opposite. It is to deter aggression.”
- Dean Acheson
“In this pact, we hope to create a shield against aggression and the fear of aggression – a bulwark which will permit us to get on with the real business of government and society, the business of achieving a fuller and happier life for all our citizens.”
- President Truman
