Wars in Ukraine, Gaza and Sudan have exposed the United Nations’ inability to manage international conflicts. Renewed rivalry between the great powers have hollowed out the Security Council’s authority, leaving the organisation looking more like an observer rather than an active mediator (Russell, 2025).
As Helmuller et al. (2026) argue, that the UN remains the most representative global actor available, and the only body able to claim international legitimacy. However, to remain credible in an increasingly multipolar world, the Security Council must become more representative of today’s distribution of power. Africa’s continued exclusion from permanent membership is therefore not only unfair; it undermines the legitimacy of a body that makes consequential decisions about the continent.
This imbalance is rooted in the Security Council’s post- war structure. Its five permanent members- China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States- still hold veto power, while no African country has a permanent seat. This is particularly problematic because Africa is frequently the subject of Council Decisions. In 2023, 78 Security Council meetings on country or regional issues, representing 38.24 percent of the total, concerned Africa. More than half of the Council’s country or region-specific resolutions that year also concerned the continent (LSE International Relations blog, 2025). Yet, African states do not have an equal, permanent role in shaping decisions that affect their peace and security. This lack of representation has been seen as a “historical injustice” and weakens the legitimacy of a Council that regularly makes decision regarding Africa (Mbete, 2023).
As power has dispersed towards states such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa, pressure has grown for international institutions to reflect the changing geopolitical situation. For instance, South Africa has used its membership of BRICS to argue that bodies such as the United Nations Security Council, IMF and World Bank do not adequately represent the interests of Africa and the Global South in general. It’s membership of BRICS shows that South Africa has not rejected multilateralism, but believes these institutions can be reformed in a way that ensures there is a fairer distribution of power and influence . This demonstrates that Security Council reform is not simply about adding seats; it is about ensuring that global decision making reflects the political realities and perspectives of the twenty- first century, thereby helping to ensure that the Security Council remains relevant.
Despite public agreement amongst the P5 states that the Security Council needs reform, meaningful change has been obstructed two factors: the permanent members’ desire to preserve their power and privileged status, and the demanding process required to amend.
The UN charter, which requires approval of two-thirds of UN members including all five permanent members. This problem is illustrated by Brazil’s unsuccessful attempt to gain a seat. Even when officials from P5 states acknowledged that Brazil’s claim had merit, they still opposed expansion because it could dilute their own power and status. This shows that reform is not simply a technical issue of updating membership; it is a political struggle over veto power and prestige in the international system. As a result, the Council’s anachronistic structure has been preserved despite repeated calls for it to reflect contemporary geopolitical realities.
A workable path to reform begins with the Ezulwini consensus, which calls for two permanent African seats on the Security Council, with full veto rights This would finally give the continent a permanent voice in decisions that disproportionately affect it. Two Seats would also reflect Africa’s size, diversity and the scale of its contribution to UN peacekeeping, rather than concentrating representation in a single country. Likely contenders could include South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt. To avoid accusations of favouritism, selection should be based on a transparent criterion such as contribution to regional peace and security, participation in peacekeeping, economic capacity and commitment to democratic governance. Adopting such an approach will strengthen the council’s legitimacy by addressing historical exclusion, rather than creating further divisions.
The Security Council’s anachronistic structure, rooted in the post- war order, can no longer be reconciled with a multipolar in which Africa bears a disproportionate share of it agenda. Reform is politically difficult because the P5 members seek to preserve their privilege, but it is also urgent if the UN seeks to remain relevant in managing contemporary conflicts.
Granting Africa two permanent seats in line with the Ezulwini consensus, selected through transparent, criteria-based processes, would address a long-standing historical injustice and strengthening the Council’s legitimacy and its ability to fulfil its goals of maintaining peace and security in today’s increasingly volatile world. Without such changes, the UN risks becoming an observer rather than an active mediator in conflicts that could destabilise entire regions.
References
(Russell, 2025)
(de Carvalho & Gruzd, 2025)
(Mbete, 2023)
(Patrick , et al., 2025)
(Yade, 2024)
(Buarque, de Sa Guimaraes, & Ribeiro, 2025)
(Bakare, 2025)
(Helmuller, et al., 2026)