Harri Jones: Britain’s China Dilemma: Trade Or Security?

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Keir Starmer’s trip to Beijing in January 2026, was the first time a British Prime Minister had visited China since Theresa May in February 2018.  Starmer’s message throughout the trip was that Britain could protect itself and do business with the world’s second-largest economy at the same time. Whether that is true is a central question in British foreign policy.

How We Got Here

Britain’s China policy has swung from Cameron’s “golden era” to a sharp deterioration after 2017, caused by Hong Kong, Xinjiang and intelligence warnings about espionage and cyber security concerns. Despite this, trade with China has not stopped: in 2024 China was the UK’s fifth largest single country trading partner with around 6% of trade.  Labour pledged to “co-operate where we can, compete where we need to, challenge where we must.” Starmer argued the previous approaches to China had been hot and cold and had therefore left Britain as an outlier next to France and Germany.

The Case For Engagement

China sits on the UN Security Council. Ministers argue you cannot raise concerns with a government  to which you refuse to talk. Starmer says he pressed the cases of Jimmy Lai, the Uyghurs and urged Beijing to stop backing Russia’s war. There were gains too: whisky tariffs halved from 10% to 5%, visa-free travel for UK visitors, new market access, and a deal on Chinese made parts used in small boats. For a government that calls growth its first mission, that matters.

The Case For Caution

Yet the government’s own assessments are stark. The 2025 Strategic Defence Review called China a “sophisticated and persistent challenge,” and the National Security Strategy warned of rising espionage and interference. Critics say diplomacy has outrun defences. The Conservatives accuse the government of being too focused on the short term, and the Liberal Democrats backed the visit but said Starmer went from a position of weakness.

Where The Tension Shows

The government insists this is not a trade-off. Starmer called security “non-negotiable”. Yet three decisions suggest the pressure is real.

First, the embassy. A week before the trip, ministers approved a vast new Chinese embassy on the old Royal Mint site. MI5, GCHQ and Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee judged the risks manageable, though the committee criticised how security advice was handled. Opponents argued that mitigation is not elimination.

Second, sanctions. China lifted its 2021 measures against six British parliamentarians during the visit. They welcomed the relief but objected to its selectivity, and Kemi Badenoch said it cost Beijing nothing.

Third, the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme. Russia and Iran sit in its toughest tier, but China does not, and the government says no decision has been taken. The “China audit” Labour promised was never published, so the public cannot see how the balance is struck.

None of this proves ministers are wrong. But it shows that “trade or security” is a series of specific calls where the weighting is often invisible.

A New Government, The Same Question

Andy Burnham became Prime Minister in July, with Ed Miliband as Foreign Secretary. Early signals point to continuity, though commentators are split on whether that is wise.

What Should The Government Do?

Because the government makes these decisions case by case, the public should be able to see how they are made.  Former diplomat Charles Parton in a 2019 paper for the defence think tank RUSI, asked where the influence ends and the interference begins. He called for more transparency when it comes to matters such as funding and where donation money really comes from, for more strict vetting of parliamentary advisers and harder look at ex-ministers and civil servants taking jobs with Chinese entities. He urged that government officials should be briefed on Chinese intelligence activity, which has improved since the 2023 national security act and the implementation of interference alerts. And he says the UK should reduce its reliance on Chinese money for research, because the results may flow back to China. These steps would not end trade with China, but they would make the risks easier to see.

Two further steps follow from today’s debate. Ministers should decide on China’s place in the influence registration scheme, even if only for named state-linked entities in sensitive sectors. And they should publish more of the audit’s thinking. Critics warn that tougher rules risk retaliation and could stigmatise British Chinese communities. The answer is to target state-linked activity, not people.

The Test Ahead

Britain does not have to choose between trade and security in the abstract. But it must choose, repeatedly and visibly, in practice. The more openly it does so, the more credible its claim that it can do both.

References

Curtis, J. (2026). UK China relations under the Labour government 2024-26. House of Commons Library, Research Briefing CBP-10481, 24 July. Available at: https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-10481/CBP-10481.pdf

Labour Party (2024). Change: Labour Party Manifesto 2024. Labour Party. Available at: https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Labour-Party-manifesto-2024.pdf

Parton, C. (2019). China–UK Relations: Where to Draw the Border Between Influence and Interference? RUSI Occasional Paper, February. Royal United Services Institute. Available at: https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/china-uk-relations-where-draw-border-between-influence-and-interference

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1 thought on “Harri Jones: Britain’s China Dilemma: Trade Or Security?”

  1. Excellent article identifying the tensions in any nations relationship with China. For some nations that tension is irresolvable. Here in Australia, China is the major importer of mineral outputs. And that trade underpins the whole economy. It is also relatively physically close so a conflict would become a serious threat.

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