The Fédération Internationale de Football Association’s (FIFA’s) recent “red-card offence” exposed decades of internal democratic decay, revealing a system in which presidential agenda and financial dependence undermined transparency and accountability . On the 28th of July 2026, FIFA’s president Gianni Infantino proposed setting up a new commercial subsidiary, FIFA Forward Enterprise, with the intention of selling 20% to private investors to raise 3.16 billion GBP. However, sustained public scrutiny and criticism from the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) and the British Prime Minister, Andy Burnham, meant the plan was abandoned after just 5 days. The controversy surrounding this proposal underlined how FIFA’s formal democratic processes do not compensate for its lack of substantive democracy.
The organisations historically centralised power allowed Mr Infantino to pursue his own agenda and control FIFA’s commercial arrangements with limited consultation of its 211 member associations. This illustrates how the executives’ dominance over agenda-setting powers enables FIFA’s leadership to prioritise its own interests, limiting stakeholders influence over policymaking. This critique was developed further by Brett and Tomlinson in 2025, where they described FIFA’s congress as more of a “showcase than a democracy”, given that its members lacked the capacity to monitor its organisational staff and the executive committee due to its size and structure. Its classification as a non-political, non-profit organisation consolidates its autonomy by limiting stakeholder accountability mechanisms that usually restrict commercial corporations, thus reducing the breadth of external oversight.
The potential sale of its commercial rights including authority over ticketing, global broadcast licensing, and sponsorships to investors such as Thrive Capital, demonstrated the presidents strive to monetise the World Cup and other FIFA competitions. With the investment aiming to raise funds for initiatives like youth pathways while retaining control over football governance and increasing revenue for members.
Despite FIFA using a one-member-one-vote procedure in practice, they do not independently decide in principle as many of them rely on the resources for development controlled by FIFA, making them less likely to challenge its leadership. Alongside this the proposed financial inducement of nearly 15 million GBP per association further compromises the impartiality of the voting process.
Had the proposal not been scrapped, a vote would have been held requiring a simple majority of 106 member associations, which fails to represent the interests of clubs, players, leagues, and fans. Thus, further highlighting the disproportionate concentration of power, as the people impacted by the organisations decisions are marginalised within FIFA’s decision-making structure. The World Leagues Association (WLA) released a statement calling for reforms to FIFA’s decision-making procedures as their judgments do not consider the “entire football pyramid” and lacks inclusivity and transparency. Extending its electorate beyond national associations would strengthen its democratic legitimacy by giving supporters an institutionalised voice to reflect the opinions of the wider football community.
However, formal representation alone is inadequate unless it is supported by effective mechanisms for public participation and independent scrutiny. Greater stakeholder involvement may increase FIFA’s legitimacy, but its substantial control over commercial rights enables it to reinforce its institutional autonomy and limit external scrutiny to avoid accountability. Furthermore, FIFA’s growing commercialisation creates tension with its legal status as a non-profit association, while the rising political influence surrounding football has intensified concerns about the organisation’s neutrality. This demonstrates why private investment in a global sporting institution necessitates independent oversight, stakeholder representation, and transparent negotiations. Ultimately, the absence of these measures contributed to the controversy surrounding the proposals opaque nature, with many members being informed about it through the media rather than from FIFA directly.
Overall, this contested proposal exposes the underlying question of who is responsible for governing global football, as many stakeholders’ interests are not considered during the decision-making process. FIFA must commit to stronger accountability mechanisms, increased stakeholder engagement, and greater transparency with the broader football community. Failure to introduce these reforms could allow FIFA’s commercial power and institutional autonomy to continue to erode the legitimacy of its governance.
References –
Brett, E A and Tomlinson, Alan. “(Mis) Governing World Football? Agency and (Non) Accountability in FIFA.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 45:1 (2024): p.108-137. https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqae036
Harris, Rob. “European nations discussing the World Cup boycott after Gianni Infantino floats selling shares in spin-off venture.” Sky News, July 28, 2026. https://news.sky.com/story/uefa-fury-as-fifa-boss-wants-to-sell-shares-in-world-cup-spin-off-venture-13567834
Pielke, R. “How can FIFA be held accountable?” Sport Management Review, 16:3 (2013): p.255-267. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.smr.2012.12.007
The Guardian. “The Guardian view on selling off the World Cup: a red-card offence by Gianni Infantino.” Opinion piece. July 29, 2026. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/jul/29/the-guardian-view-on-selling-off-the-world-cup-a-red-card-offence-by-gianni-infantino
World Leagues Association. “World Leagues Association statement on FIFA Forward Enterprise.” July 30, 2026. https://www.worldleagues.com/en/media/world-leagues-association-statement-on-fifa-forward-enterprise